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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
On Monday, November 22, 2004, the Prime Minister of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych 
was declared the winner of the presidential elections. According to the official results, he 
defeated his opponent, opposition leader Viktor Yuschenko, with a small, but still 
comfortable margin of almost three percent.  However, Yanukovych was never inaugurated 
as President of Ukraine, because on the same day hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians 
poured onto the streets to protest what they saw as blatant election fraud. These mass 
demonstrations lasted for two weeks, and, as a result, a parliamentary vote and a ruling by 
the Supreme Court denounced this election and refused to legitimize it. The unprecedented 
‘third round’ (the rerun of the second round) was won by the opposition candidate at the 
end of December 2004. 
During the elections crisis, the world witnessed a serious deterioration of relations 
between Russia and the West. Russia endorsed Yanukovych who was seen as a pro-Russian 
candidate, while the West supported Viktor Yuschenko who was seen as a pro-Western 
reformist. Russian president Vladimir Putin twice congratulated Yanukovych on his ‘victory’ 
even before the official results were announced. In contrast, the Western leaders and mass 
media were mostly sympathetic to Yuschenko and his supporters. 
In fact, New York Times and Western press overall did not pay much attention to the 
Ukrainian presidential election until the protests broke. Similarly, Izvestia’s coverage, though 
more attentive to Ukrainian issues due to historical reasons, was also quite average. However, 
when the protests known now as the Orange Revolution started, Ukraine became much 
bigger news both in the United States and Russia. Probably never in its modern history was 
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Ukraine covered so intensively in the American and Russian press. This study assesses 
coverage of the elite American and Russian quality dailies, the New York Times and Izvestia 
respectively, and the researcher employs frame analysis as his methodology and critical 
theory as the theoretical framework. 
Critical theory is inspired by Marxist political economy, but has been updated with a 
new reading. It was especially influenced by Antonio Gramsci and his conception of 
hegemony. Hegemony implied that the dominance of certain formations was secured, not by 
ideological compulsion, but by cultural leadership. Thus, media (and other signifying 
institutions) not only reflect and sustain the consensus in society, but also help to produce 
the consensus and manufacture consent (Hall, 1982).  
 Carragee and Roefs (2004) argue that “the media hegemony thesis directly connects 
the framing process to considerations of power and to examinations of the relationship 
between the news media and political change.” Therefore, studying the framing process 
within the context of the production, distribution, and interpretation of hegemonic meanings 
allows researchers to find the relationship between news and the distribution of power in 
American society. “Frames, as imprints of power, are central to the production of 
hegemonic meanings” (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 222). 
Overall, the Gramscian concept of hegemony argues that the dominant class will use 
any means to spread its ideology through society, and mass media is an extremely important 
instrument in this struggle. In any society the media are used to bring the political message 
of the government to the population, and foreign policy is not an exception.  
This study is significant for several reasons. First, it will be one of the first 
assessments of the media coverage of the modern-day “velvet revolutions” which happened 
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in several post-Socialist countries in recent years (Serbia 2001, Georgia 2003, Ukraine 2004, 
and Kyrgyzstan 2005). These revolutions are new phenomena, and their international news 
coverage has rarely been studied. Second, this research will address important questions 
regarding the ideological role of the mass media. Finally, it will probe whether Chomsky and 
Herman’s propaganda model for mass media is still relevant in the United States and Russia. 
This paper will consist of four chapters. First, the subject and purpose of the study 
and the theoretical framework will be covered. Next, the research questions and the 
methodology of the study (frame analysis), sampling, and data collection will be explained. 
This will be followed by the reporting of the results and their analysis, and a conclusion.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
METHODOLOGY 
The main focus of this study is to analyze how the 2004 presidential elections and 
the Orange Revolution in Ukraine were framed in the American and Russian press. The 
following specific question will be explored: How were the Ukrainian presidential elections 
and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine framed by the New York Times and Izvestia? Frame 
analysis will be employed as a method of this study. 
Framing research originates from the sociological research of Goffman (1974) and 
the media sociology of Tuchman (1978) and Gitlin. One of the most common definitions of 
what is meant by “to frame” is “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them 
more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the 
item described” (Entman, 1991).  
In general, frame analysis is a type of narrative/content analysis in which the 
researcher explores text to identify the frame in order to pinpoint the rhetoric of the writer 
and/or the news organization. More specifically, frame analysis assesses whether or not 
journalistic text plays a political role. Ideally, framing research examines how frames are 
sponsored by political actors, how journalists employ frames in the construction of news 
stories, how these stories articulate frames, and how audience members interpret these 
frames (Carragee & Roefs, 2004). 
Frame analysis examines reasoning devices used to explain the news event and 
framing devices used to characterize the event.  Reasoning devices provide justifications or 
reasons for a general position; these are: roots (causal interpretations of issues), 
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consequences, and appeals to principle (Carragee and Roefs, 2004, p. 223). Framing devices 
include: sources (all people directly quoted in the text); keywords (words that appear in a 
headline and are then repeated in the text, words that appear frequently in the body of 
stories, or words that have particular salience due to their placement within the text or their 
cultural resonance for the news audience); metaphors (the figures of speech in which a word 
for one idea or thing is used in place of another to suggest likeness between them); agency 
(the person or group identified as causing or solving the problem; the causal force that 
created the newsworthy act). In the course of analysis, each story is read to determine 
specific patterns found in the coverage, focusing systematically on dimensions that have 
been identified in previous studies as framing devices: sources, keywords, metaphors and 
agency (Entman, 1991; Wall, 1997).  
This study analyzes the coverage of Ukraine’s 2004 presidential campaign in the 
American daily the New York Times and the Russian newspaper Izvestia. The time period of 
the analysis is from the beginning of the Ukrainian presidential campaign coverage (October 
12, 2004 in the New York Times, October 21, 2004 in Izvestia) till the last reports about 
Yuschenko’s inauguration (which happened on January 22) on January 24, 2005. 
The New York Times and Izvestia were chosen because they are known in the USA and 
Russia respectively as leading elite publications paying special attention to the international 
news. Based in the biggest cities of their countries (New York and Moscow), they are the 
most influential papers in the U.S. and Russia (Malinkina & McLeod, 2000). The New York 
Times is the most authoritative source of information and guidance on issues of public policy 
(Friel & Falk, 2004) and one of the oldest newspapers in the USA (founded in 1851) with 
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one of the highest circulations in the country – 1,121,057 in September 2004 (“Circulation,” 
2005).  
The articles from Izvestia were collected through a keyword research of Izvestia’s web 
site search engine. The keyword “Ukraine” produced 306 total stories. All news articles and 
commentaries (there is no clear distinction between news stories and editorials in the 
Russian press) longer than 100 words and focused on the topic of the Ukrainian elections 
and the Orange Revolution were included with the exception of the Q-and-A stories. 
Because of the data collection method, the place and position of the articles in Izvestia is not 
known. It is also possible that the online versions of Izvestia’s articles differ from the printed 
ones. 
The data from the New York Times was accessed through the Lexis-Nexis database 
using the same criteria. The keyword “Ukraine” produced 184 total stories.  All articles 
longer than 100 words focused on the topic of the Ukrainian elections and the Orange 
Revolution were included in the analysis. As a result, a total of 153 stories (79 articles from 
Izvestia and 74 articles from the New York Times) were downloaded and printed out. 
All the stories were be read first for comprehension. On the second time the 
researcher “open-coded” each story. The sample codesheet included four ‘technical’ 
questions (name of publication; date and year; length, location, and type of the story; title 
and author) and five theme questions. The themes include the campaigning and voting 
process; the mass demonstrations; the main candidates (Yuschenko and Yanukovych), their 
programs and their popular support; difference between Ukrainian East and West; and the 
foreign actions/attitudes (namely world leaders, the USA, Russia, the European Union, 
West). These questions were applied to the articles, and the codesheet for each article will be 
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filled with supporting examples and observations. Afterward the researcher compared the 
findings, probed for particular framing devices, determined which words and images are the 
components of the frame and discovered the consistent patterns of the overall frame 
(Entman, 1993; Wall, 1997).  
The credibility and trustworthiness of this research was guaranteed in three ways. 
First, the researcher provided rich and thick description using the numerous examples from 
original texts to illustrate and provide specific support for arguments (Creswell, 1998). And, 
second, the researcher’s background secures his deep understanding of Ukrainian political, 
economical and cultural issues. He was raised in Ukraine, and has a fluent knowledge of 
English and native knowledge of Ukrainian and Russian languages. His academic 
background includes degrees in Political Science and Journalism.  
This study is limited to its own data and analysis, and its results cannot be 
generalized. The researcher analyzed the coverage of only one event by two newspapers – 
the New York Times (USA) and Izvestia (Russia). Thus, they cannot represent the American 
and Russian print media as a whole. The time frame of the study was limited, and the sample 
included not all stories, but only those more than 100 words long. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 In this chapter, the problem, cause, solution, and moral claims found in the New 
York Times’ and Izvestia’s coverage, as well as their interpretation will be discussed. The 
findings of this study suggest that both newspapers employed the same frame in their 
coverage, even though their portrayal of the crisis in Ukraine was different, and sometimes 
even opposite. 
 
The Problem 
The New York Times 
The electoral fraud was depicted by the New York Times as the primary problem in its 
coverage of the presidential elections and the ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine. It was the 
reason for the mass protests and a severe political crisis inside Ukraine, which led to a 
serious confrontation between the West and Russia on the international arena. For American 
newspaper, the electoral fraud was a justified cause for the conflict which polarized Ukraine 
and the whole world for several weeks in the end of 2004. 
Since its beginning, the presidential campaign in Ukraine was portrayed as “a fiercely 
contested fight over the country’s future” (Meyers, 2004, para. 16) between two rival 
politicians – Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and leader of opposition Viktor Yuschenko. 
The tensions culminated in the second round of the election which had to name the winner 
of the presidential race, and which was officially won by Yanukovych. This vote was 
characterized by the New York Times as ‘disputed’. This categorization appeared 44 times in 
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the text, as well as in two headlines: “Ukraine Court Delays Results In Vote Dispute” 
(Chivers, 2004); “Rivals in Ukraine Agree to Negotiate Over Disputed Vote” (Chivers, 2004). 
Overall, the voting was characterized by such words as “fraud” (Chivers, 2004, para. 
3), “abuse” (Chivers, 2004, para. 1), “irregularities” (Chivers, 2004, para. 9), and “violation” 
(Meyers, 2004, para. 6). The keyword “fraud” (“fraudulent”) was used most of all – 108 
times in the text and once in the headline: “Powell Says Ukraine Vote Was Full of Fraud” 
(Weisman, 2004). This word choice suggested that the New York Times didn’t see 
Yanukovych’s victory as legitimate, claiming that there was “a pattern of harassment and 
electoral irregularities that calls into question the fairness of the vote to elect Mr. Kuchma's 
successor” (Meyers, 2004, para. 4).  
Therefore, after the second round of the election, Yanukovych was portrayed as the 
“official winner” (Chivers, 2004, para. 2), “nominal winner” (Chivers, 2004, para. 5), or 
“officially declared winner” (Meyers, 2004, para. 2), but never as just ‘winner.’ On the other 
hand, Yuschenko was portrayed by the New York Times as the “declared loser” (Chivers, 
2004, para. 1) or “officially defeated presidential candidate” (Chivers, 2004, para. 1), and 
these depiction implied that he was not really defeated. Thus, an American newspaper made 
the clear accents that suggested that the Yanukovych’s official victory was not real, and that 
the Yuschenko’s defeat was not final.  
The accents changed after the second round’s rerun, when, even before all votes 
were counted and the official results published, the New York Times proclaimed the winner, 
Yuschenko, “Ukraine’s presumptive president-elect” (Chivers, 2004, para. 1), while 
Yanukovych was portrayed as “the evident loser” (Chivers, 2005, para. 1). Moreover, in this 
‘third round,’ according to American newspaper, the problem of fraud was solved: despite 
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the reports about the irregularities it was declared “relatively free of the type of bare-
knuckled fraud that doomed the original” (Meyers, 2005, para. 6).  
This word choice suggests that the New York Times was biased in its coverage of the 
Ukrainian presidential campaign: its sympathy was clearly with the opposition leader – 
Viktor Yuschenko. Therefore, the problem of electoral fraud which aroused so seriously in 
the second round and during the mass protests was downplayed in the coverage of the first 
and ‘third’ rounds won by Yuschenko. 
The New York Times also identified the “split” (Arvedlund, 2004, para. 1) between 
“the agrarian west” of Ukraine which “is ardently nationalist, predominantly Catholic and 
anti-Russian” and “the industrial south and east” which “are predominantly oriented toward 
Russia in speech and religion” (Schmemann, 2004, December 9, para. 7). However, it was 
depicted as just one in the complex of many cultural, social and economic problems facing 
Ukraine, and not as a reason of the conflict.  
This image of the sharply divided country consisting of two hostile parts was 
incorrect, because the real picture of Ukraine is much more complicated (for example, 
Central Ukraine provides a balance between the opposites of West and East). There were 
also some mistakes in the coverage regarding the regional divide of Ukraine: the newspaper 
mentioned “a civil conflict between the country's starkly divided regions, dominated by 
ethnic Ukrainians in the west and ethnic Russians in the east” (Meyers, 2004, December 4, 
para. 7), even though, in fact, ethnic Russians dominate in only one Southern Ukrainian 
region – Crimea. 
 
Izves t ia 
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For Izvestia, the primary problem of the conflict laid in the historical difference 
between ‘pro-Western’ (and ‘anti-Russian’) Western Ukraine and ‘pro-Russian’ Eastern 
Ukraine. The electoral fraud was not seen as reason serious enough to provoke a political 
crisis with the global implications. Moreover, the newspaper mentioned that “falsifications 
were always present in democratic Ukraine” (Pankin, 2004, para. 7), implying that the 
electoral fraud is a usual Ukrainian (and, actually, post-Soviet) political practice, so it could 
not lead to such a crisis. 
Therefore, for Izvestia, the ‘Orange Revolution’ was not a struggle of citizens for the 
democratic cause of honest and transparent election, but, first of all, the internal Ukrainian 
‘East versus West’ conflict:  
“Split into East and West is not just a fact of Ukrainian election, but a diagnosis of 
Ukrainian statehood in its current state” (Zatulin, 2004, para. 5). 
 
  Thus, the historical division of Ukrainian society was emphasized. To express this 
division Izvestia used the keyword “split” (Zatulin, 2004, para. 4). It was used 26 times in the 
coverage and was applied not only to regions, but also to Ukrainian celebrities, politicians, 
and government institutions. The ‘split’ was total, and the idea of hostile ‘East’ and ‘West’ 
ran through all coverage of Ukrainian campaign:  
“It was predictable that the country will split Ukraine into ‘Russian East’ and 
‘national West’. Ukraine is clearly split into two parts. To the right of the imagined 
line going from the Northeast to the Southwest there are nine Russian-speaking 
regions and the city Sebastopol which supported Yanukovych. To the left – 16 
oblasts and city Kyiv that voted for Yuschenko” (Sokolovskaya & Yusin, 2004, para. 
10, 11). 
 
Izvestia insisted that the regional differences were so deep-rooted that these parts of 
Ukraine may be even considered separate countries: “West and Southeast are like two 
different countries: Russian-Ukrainian and Galician-Ukrainian” (Markov, 2004, para. 10). 
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Thus, the Southeast was a close region, actually almost Russian or ‘Russian-Ukrainian,’ while 
the West was alien, ‘Galician’ (Galicia is one of Western Ukrainian regions, which is known 
in Russia as a center of anti-Russian nationalism). Comparing these two parts Izvestia always 
stressed that Eastern Ukraine is richer and more populous than the Western:  
“All Western Ukrainian regions give the Ukrainian national budget only three 
percent of the income while Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions – a quarter of the 
whole budget” (Bausin & Sokolovskaya, 2004, para. 7).  
 
As East and West were supporting two different candidates (Yanukovych and 
Yuschenko), Izvestia depicted election as a strategic conflict. Even before the second round, 
Russian newspaper predicted that there will be no compromise between the rivals, and that 
“the loser will not accept his defeat” (Grigorieva, 2004, para. 7). Therefore, Izvestia expected 
the coming conflict and emphasized the competitive side of the election. The theme of 
winning or loosing was obvious in the headlines that sometimes reminded sports reports: “A 
Draw in Favor of a Premier” (Sokolovskaya & Yusin, 2004); “Yuschenko Defeated 
Yanukovych” (Grigorieva, 2004); “Ukraine Should Choose the Loser” (Grigorieva, 2004); 
“East defeated West” (Grigorieva & Sokolovskaya, 2004); “Orange Ukraine Defeated White-
Blue Ukraine” (Yusin, 2004). 
To dramatize depiction of the conflict Russian newspaper used the word ‘war,’ 
which appeared twice in the headlines: “War of Exit Polls Could Provoke the Events” 
(Grigorieva, 2004); “Two Ukraines: Geopolitics of Crisis and Map of Civil War” (Dugin, 
2004), and in the text. One article mentioned “war of meetings,” “war of complaints,” and 
“war of comments” (Grigorieva & Sokolovskaya, 2004, para. 4, 5), and before the third 
round another article warned its readers that “the battle is lost, but not the war” (Yusin, 2004, 
para. 4). 
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Causes 
Both the New York Times and Izvestia identified the internal and foreign actors as the 
underlying causes of the Ukrainian crisis. However, both newspapers selected the different 
sides of the conflict and their allies abroad to portray as the conflict’s cause. For Russian 
newspaper, it was the oppositional candidate Viktor Yuschenko and his supporters inside 
Ukraine and in the West who provoked the conflict, while for their American colleagues – 
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych with his camp and Russia. 
 
The New York Times 
For the New York Times, the cause of the conflict was the corrupt government inside 
country which was accountable for the falsifications, as well as the influence of Russian 
government. Ukrainian government was personified by the outgoing president Leonid 
Kuchma and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, while Russian interference was usually 
embodied in the person of president Putin who was characterized as “a co-conspirator with 
Ukraine's outgoing president, Leonid Kuchma, to tilt the campaign and fix the election in 
favor of the pro-Moscow candidate” (Kristof, 2004, para. 8). 
 
Foreign interference  
Russian intrusion was stressed by the New York Times’ reporters since the beginning 
of the campaign. They portrayed Yanukovych as benefiting from a “high-profile support 
offered by… Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin” (Meyers, 2004, para. 17). The Russian 
president’s visits to Kyiv were characterized as “interfering in another country’s internal 
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affairs” and “Russia’s soft imperialism” (Meyers, 2004, para. 3). In fact, it was Vladimir Putin, 
not Russia as a country, who was found personally responsible for the Russian foreign policy:  
“Mr. Putin's direct interference underscores his keen desire to keep Ukraine, in 
particular, Russia's historical and cultural partner, from tipping toward the West and 
further diminishing Moscow's reach” (Meyers, 2004, para. 4);  
 
“Long before mass street protests paralyzed Kiev, Mr. Putin had injected himself 
into the race, campaigning on behalf of Mr. Yanukovich and then publicly 
congratulating him on his victory” (Chivers, 2004, para. 8). 
 
Therefore, the New York Times attacked not Russia which is supposed to be an 
American ally in the global war against the terrorism, but the country’s president. American 
newspaper also did not want to acknowledge a substantial Western interest in the victory of 
Yuschenko. So, Russian support for Yanukovych was characterized as open, while Western 
support for Yuschenko – as subtle:  
“Russia and President Vladimir V. Putin himself have come out so strongly for the 
candidate promising closer relations with Moscow, Viktor F. Yanukovich, while 
Europe and the United States are supporting Viktor A. Yushchenko, albeit more 
subtly” (Meyers, 2004, para. 2).  
 
After the ‘Orange Revolution’ won, the New York Times mentioned that some groups 
in the West accuse American government, as well as such Democratic and Republican 
institutions as NED and IRI, of “conspiring to underwrite and orchestrate the revolution, in 
part through grants and foreign aid” (Chivers, 2004, para. 19).  However, this alleged 
Western conspiracy was never investigated. 
Thus, the West was a ‘good force’ in Ukrainian conflict, the defender of democracy, 
while Russia was a ‘dark force’ trying to steal the Ukrainian election. Russian Federation in 
this coverage was definitely a successor to the Soviet Union, and the negative coverage it 
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received was reminiscent of the American-Soviet confrontation during the Cold War. It is 
not strange that the Cold War parallels were ubiquitous:  
“The standoff had a cold war quality, as the United States and Russia tussled over 
spheres of influence and political principles” (Shane, 2004, para. 6);  
 
“Russian officials dusted off cold war vocabulary and summoned bitter visions of 
lost imperial ambitions and fears of Western meddling in Russia’s sphere of 
influence” (Arvedlund, 2004, para. 1);  
 
“The election also exposed tensions between Russia and the West not seen since 
NATO bombed Serbia in 1999, and perhaps since the cold war” (Meyers, 2004, para. 
7). 
 
The Soviet Union was alive again in the headline “The Eternal Suspicions of the 
Soviet Mind-Set” (Schmemann, 2004). And as the tensions grew, the New York Times asked a 
rhetorical question: “So has a Ukrainian political standoff escalated to a Russian-American 
confrontation out of the cold war, ‘captive nations’ and all” (Whitney, 2004, para. 3)? The 
newspaper’s coverage with the headlines like “Eastern Front, 2004” (Judt, 2004) and “The 
New East-West Divide” (Whitney, 2004) implied the answer: the world was once again 
portrayed as a contest between Russia and the West, the competition for Ukraine.  
 Overall, the accents made by the New York Times in its coverage of the 
international politics around the Ukrainian presidential election are clearly seen in this 
conclusion made after Yuschenko’s victory:  
“And Europe and the United States, which both rightly fought for a fair and 
democratic election, must now work to dispel any perception that it is Washington 
and Brussels, not Kiev, calling the shots. For his part, Mr. Putin disgraced himself by 
meddling in the internal affairs of Ukraine – which he clearly considers one of his 
territories.” (“President,” 2004, para. 3, 4). 
 
Domestic aspect 
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 Inside Ukraine the cause of the conflict for the New York Times was the government 
and its presidential candidate – Viktor Yanukovych. It becomes evident in comparison of his 
and Yuschenko’s portrayals in American newspaper. Yanukovych was seen as a candidate 
“promising to follow [the departing president] Kuchma’s course,” while Yuschenko – as 
“promising to steer the country toward a more open and democratic path, more closely 
allied with Europe” (Meyers, 2004, para. 12). As the president Kuchma’s course was 
associated with the “cronyism and corruption” (Meyers, 2004, para. 7), it is clear that the 
Western public would perceive Yanukovych as a negative character. 
 Moreover, Yanukovych’s name in the coverage was almost always connected to the 
infamous president Kuchma: usually he was referred to as Kuchma’s “choice” (Meyers, 2004, 
para. 6) or “successor” (Chivers, 2004, para. 8). The Russian president’s support for 
Yanukovych was also often reflected in the articles: the Prime Minister was called “Mr. 
Putin’s choice” (Shane, 2004, para. 4). Actually, Yanukovych was shown as even more pro-
Russian than Kuchma:  
“While Mr. Kuchma tilted alternately toward Russia and Western Europe, Mr. 
Yanukovich promised to cultivate closer ties with Russia, proposing to make Russian 
an official language and to allow dual citizenship” (Meyers, 2004, para. 13, 14). 
 
 On the other hand, Yuschenko was shown as a “liberal, democratic reformer” 
(Meyers, 2004, para. 17) who was promising to push country toward the West. Unlike his 
opponent, Yuschenko was praised for his past endeavors: “he was involved in steering the 
Ukraine from Communism to a market economy, developing monetary and credit policies, 
and introducing the hryvnia, Ukraine's currency” (Chivers, 2004, para. 13). However, the 
New York Times never told its readers that Yuschenko was also a Prime Minister under 
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‘corrupt Kuchma,’ and that he, as well as Yanukovych, is also a product of the Soviet system, 
a former member of the Communist party and a part of Soviet bureaucracy.  
 Instead, the candidates’ differences (especially their geopolitical aspirations) were 
stressed, so they were portrayed as the absolute antipodes. The newspaper did not pay 
attention to the Yuschenko’s declaration to develop the good relations with Russia, and 
Yanukovych’s intentions to continue Ukraine’s move to the West. Even though both 
candidates claimed to be dedicated to Ukrainian interest, they were labeled as ‘pro-Western’ 
or ‘pro-Russian.’ The extreme dichotomization of the coverage is clearly seen in this editorial:  
“The choice facing Ukrainian voters on Sunday, in the second round of their 
presidential election, was about as clear as choices get: East or West. In the 
shorthand of the race, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich was pro-Russian, and his 
opponent, Viktor Yushchenko, the head of the opposition and a former prime 
minister, was pro-Western” (“Ukraine,” 2004, November 23, para. 1).  
 
 Thus, the New York Times’ portrayal of Yuschenko and his supporters was aimed to 
evoke sympathy of the Western readers, while Yanukovych and his camp were shown as the 
‘bad guys’ of Ukrainian conflict, the agents of Russian influence. Russia and its president, 
Vladimir Putin, were portrayed absolutely negatively, and this depiction of Russian 
involvement clearly had the Cold War quality.  
 
Izves t ia 
Izvestia also provided its readers with the picture of intense clash between ‘good’ and 
‘dark’ forces in Ukraine. However, for Russian newspaper, the conflict was caused by the 
opposition candidate Viktor Yuschenko and his supporters in Ukraine and Western 
countries. First of all, Yuschenko was personally responsible for the turmoil and the split of 
the country: 
March 17-19, 2006 
 20 
 “Yuschenko is provoking the split of Ukraine – it’s impossible not to see. Gathering 
the crowds, he is drawing the line of divide. Supporting the street revolution in the 
West, he is urging the East to respond with the same” (Grigorieva, 2004, para. 3).  
 
Izvestia saw the mass protests not as a tool of direct democracy, but as provocation 
leading to the split of the country. However, when some pro-Russian politicians from several 
Southern and Eastern regions were trying to proclaim the Southeastern Ukrainian 
Autonomous Republic during the ‘Orange Revolution’, their move was depicted by Russian 
newspaper not as an actual effort to split Ukraine, but as an “answer to the decision of 
Western Ukrainian mayors to recognize Viktor Yuschenko as a president” (Sokolovskaya & 
Shesternina, 2004, para. 14).  
 
Foreign interference 
Unlike the New York Times, Izvestia focused more on the internal aspects of the 
Ukrainian crisis. However, Russian newspaper also mentioned “those who support 
Yuschenko in European countries” (Grigorieva, 2004, para. 2) as another cause of the 
conflict. The American influence was also present in the coverage, for example, in the 
reports about the financial support for Ukrainian opposition. As Izvestia stated, “the 
Ukrainian election split not only Ukraine to East and West, but the whole world” 
(Sokolovskaya & Shesternina, 2004, para. 3).  
Ukraine was also called the reason of one of the most serious confrontations 
between Russia and the EU, and both Russian Federation and the European Union were 
reported to have the same goal: “getting the comfortable rear and realization of geopolitical 
ambitions” (Grigorieva, 2004, para. 10). Therefore, the European Union was portrayed as a 
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force trying to include Ukraine in its geopolitical sphere of influence, thus hurting the 
Russian national interests. 
 The character of the Izvestia coverage changed during the ‘Orange Revolution.’ Most 
notably, Russian newspaper recognized that Russia was one of the crisis’ causes, even though 
“not the only one and not the most important” (Pankin, 2004, para. 6). The newspaper also 
described the whole Russian ‘Ukrainian strategy’ in 2004 as “a row of mistakes and 
disappointments” (Yusin, 2004, para. 2) and the outcome of the Ukrainian presidential 
elections – as the “biggest diplomatic defeat of Russia since collapse of the USSR” (Yusin, 
2004, para. 1).  
 
Domestic aspect 
 Izvestia’s portrayal of Viktor Yuschenko was very critical. He was depicted as a “pro-
Western” (Bausin & Sokolovskaya, 2004, para. 5) or even “ultra-Western” (Dugin, 2004, 
para. 3) politician, which is a negative characteristic for most Russian readers. Moreover, as 
Yuschenko’s wife, Kateryna Chumachenko, was an American citizen by the time of the 
presidential campaign she was usually referred to as the “American wife” (Sokolovskaya & 
Yusin, 2004, para. 16) and Yuschenko himself was called an “American son-in-law” 
(Sokolovskaya, 2004, para. 2). To make him even more unacceptable for Russian public, 
which is highly intolerable to Ukrainian nationalism, Izvestia portrayed Yuschenko as and 
“extreme nationalist” (Sokolovskaya, 2004, para. 10) who is “influenced by radicals” 
(Markov, 2004, para. 12) and “surrounded by nationalists” (Zatulin, 2004, para. 9). After the 
second round and beginning of the protests Yuschenko was ridiculed as a “self-proclaimed 
president” (Solovskaya, Bausin & Stepanov, 2004, para. 4). 
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 During the mass demonstrations, Yuschenko supporters were usually portrayed by 
Izvestia unsympathetically. Russian reporters even invented such words as “orangists” 
(Grigorieva & Sokolovskaya, 2004, para. 10) or “Americanists” (Sokolovskaya, 2004, para. 11) 
that sounded like ‘fascists’ to refer to them. Another word with negative connotation 
invented by Izvestia reporters was “Yuschenkovtsy” (Sokolovskaya & Shesternina, 2004, para. 
11), and it reminded Russian readers about the members of different forces fighting against 
Red Army during the Civil War in 1917-1922. Once Izvestia even compared them to German 
Nazis: “it [pro-Yuschenko demonstration] reminded the sequences from the film Ordinary 
Fascism” (Sokolov-Mitrich, 2004, para. 17). The newspaper also used quotation marks with 
words like “revolutionaries” to undermine the protesters’ cause. 
The protesters were portrayed as conflict-oriented and “ready to use force” 
(Grigorieva & Sokolovskaya, 2004, para. 17). Actually, the beginning of the ‘chestnut 
revolution’ (chestnut tree is a symbol of Kyiv) was announced even before the first round of 
elections, when Izvestia reported about the opposition’s “intentions to seizure power” 
(Sokolovskaya, 2004, para. 1). During the mass protests Russian newspaper often used the 
word ‘to storm’ to depict the protesters as more radical than they actually were: 
“Yushenkovtsy planning the storms” (Sokolovskaya & Shesternina, 2004, para. 11). 
Yuschenko supporters were also reported to “provoke unrest” (Grigorieva, 2004, para. 5), 
and sometimes Izvestia informed its readers about the “seizure of the government buildings” 
(Sokolovskaya & Shesternina, 2004, para. 8), whereas in reality they were only blocked.  
Overall, this kind of coverage was opposite to reality, and portrayed the opposition 
supporters as an aggressive crowd while not even one act of violence was registered during 
the ‘Orange Revolution.’ Another Izvestia’s inaccuracy during the crisis was in portraying the 
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protesters as the representatives of the insignificant part of Ukraine’s population. The 
reporters stressed that it was mainly students who were protesting, even though all age and 
social groups took part in the protests. 
 In additions to these attempts to portray Yuschenko supporters as dangerous, 
Russian newspaper was also ridiculing them: “people on Independence Square were freezing 
and became not orange, but blue – as Yanukovych emblems” (Grigorieva & Sokolovskaya, 
2004, para. 5). Yuschenko himself was ridiculed even after the campaign was finally over – 
during the inauguration Izvestia portrayed him as a “Ukrainian ‘king’” (Sokolovskaya, 2005, 
para. 2). 
 On the contrary, Viktor Yanukovych received a favorable coverage in Russian 
newspaper. His closeness to Russia was stressed: he was addressed in Izvesrta as “pro-Russian 
Premier” (Sokolovskaya, 2004, para. 1), and even “our candidate” (Leskov, 2004, para. 7). 
The newspaper praised him as a successful Prime Minister whose government made more 
for Ukraine’s economy than Yuschenko’s. Right after the second round, which was later 
announced invalid, Izvestia tried to legitimize the favorable for Yanukovych results calling 
him the “winner of the election” (Grigorieva & Sokolovskaya, 2004, para. 3).  
Overall, both candidates were shown by Izvestis as contrapositional: Yuschenko as 
ultra-Western and Yanukovych as pro-Russian. Therefore, Yanukovych, as well as his 
supporters, received more sympathetic coverage than Yuschenko. Pro-Yuschenko 
demonstrators who were shown not as peaceful, but as aggressive and dangerous. In its 
portrayal of foreign involvement, Izvestia, similarly to the New York Times, recreated the Cold 
War picture of the global East-West divide with the West trying to harm the Russian 
national interests. 
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Solutions 
The New York Times 
Only the Westerners (American, Dutch, British, and Polish officials) were portrayed 
by the New York Times as working to solve the problem facing Ukraine. The most active 
among them were Polish president Aleksandr Kwasniewski and Javier Solana, the European 
Union's foreign policy chief who were presented as the “international mediators” (Chivers, 
2004, para. 1). Therefore, the newspaper offered the solution identical to that of the West. 
First, it called for a recount of the votes, but later adopted the line of Ukrainian opposition 
which insisted on the rerun of the second round. The idea of the whole new election 
proposed by president Kuchma was never taken seriously into account. 
By contrast, Russians were portrayed only as trying to interfere into Ukraine’s affairs. 
They were shown supporting the Yanukovych camp, and, thus, trying to ruin the West’s 
mediation efforts. For example, the speaker of Russian parliament’s lower house Boris 
Gryzlov (who also took part in the talks between Yuschenko, Kuchma and Yanukovych) 
was never depicted as a mediator. Instead, he was shown as “a counterweight” (Meyers, 2004, 
para. 5) to the Westerners and a source of “the overt support” (Meyers, 2004, para. 22) for 
Yanukovych.  
The Western observers, who were presenting such organizations as from the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Parliament, the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly and the Council of Europe, were shown by the New York Times the 
major source of criticism toward the Ukrainian government. They blamed Ukrainian 
government for irregularities during the vote and called for an investigation or recount. 
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However, American newspaper didn’t mention the CIS observers who found the second 
round of election legitimate and democratic.   
Usually the New York Times used expressions like “leading Western nations” (Chivers, 
2004, para. 7) to articulate the position of the West.  They were reported to “condemn the 
official results” (Chivers, 2004, para. 7) and “put pressure on Ukraine for a recount or 
investigation of Mr. Yushchenko's charges” (Chivers, 2004, para. 31). American officials 
were shown to use even stricter vocabulary like stating that the U.S. “could not accept a 
victory by Victor F. Yanukovich as legitimate” (Weisman, 2004, para. 1).  
Thus, the U.S. was portrayed as the primary source of warnings to the Ukrainian 
leadership and Moscow, while Europeans were mostly depicted as mediators. However, 
once the New York Times admitted that actually it was “Mr. Bush… working through the 
Europeans, and especially the Poles, to achieve a solution, and he may fear that too public an 
American role would anger the Russians and revive the cold war” (Kristof, 2004, para. 13). 
Therefore, American newspaper recognized the leading role of the U.S. in the Western 
mediation. 
Overall, the Westerners were shown as the saviors of young Ukrainian democracy, 
while Russians were supporting the authoritarian Kuchma regime. The solution offered by 
the newspaper (first, recount of the votes, and then, the rerun of the second round) was 
identical to the solution offered by the West. Moreover, it was in line with the Ukrainian’s 
opposition demands. Thus, it is a clear evidence of the New York Times support of the 
Western position in the conflict.  
 
Izves t ia 
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Izvestia, as well as Russian leadership, failed to present any clear solution of the 
conflict. It claimed that the election was democratic, and Yanukovych was a legitimate 
president. Russian newspaper expected that the protests should fade away soon, and 
Ukrainian politicians would start the negotiations. Speculating about the possible outcome of 
these talks, Izvestia hoped that Yanukovych’s presidency would be the best variant for 
Ukraine. 
Therefore, the newspaper expected the solution to come from within Ukraine, and 
objected to the outside pressure (first of all, from the West). Among the possible sources of 
solution, it mentioned Ukrainian politicians like ex-President Leonid Kuchma and speaker of 
the parliament Volodymyr Lytvyv who were depicted as the “only two men who may 
reconcile the East and the West which elected different presidents: President Kuchma and 
speaker Lytvyn” (Bondarenko, 2004, para. 9).  
Western mediation was shown as an intervention aimed at “weakening the Russian 
influence in post-Soviet sphere” (Ratiani, 2004, para. 1). Izvestia reported that Russian 
officials would also like to be in the role of mediators, but admitted that Russia “has 
disqualified itself to be a neutral mediator” (Pankin, 2004, para. 6). However, when tensions 
in Ukraine grew, Western mediators were portrayed as the “main hope that the crisis will be 
solved peacefully” (Sokolovskaya & Shesternina, 2004, para. 1).  
 
Moral claims 
The New York Times 
 The understanding of democratic principles was used by the New York Times to 
generalize about the people involved in the conflict. Therefore, the Yuschenko supporters 
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shared the American journalists’ sympathy toward their leader. The extent and democratic 
nature of their protests were emphasized in such portrayals as “the extraordinary uprising of 
popular sentiment” (Meyers, 2004, para. 8) or “unexpected democratic force” (Safire, 2004, 
para. 5). Some portrayals were almost romantic: “Crowds jammed the snowy central squares 
of Kiev all week, singing, chanting and freezing for Ukrainian democracy” (Shane, 2004, para. 
1).  
The peaceful and joyful character of the protests was also reflected in many articles 
in which the demonstrations were compared to festival, dance parties, or rock concert. The 
reporters emphasized the bloodless outcome of the mass demonstrations: “Without blood 
or chaos or coup… they had stopped their government as it stole an election” (Chivers, 
2004, para. 16). For American newspaper, the ‘Orange Revolution’ was  
“less reminiscent of Tiananmen and more suggestive of the protesters who, through 
peaceful free assembly, won union rights at the shipyards in Gdansk, or cheered a 
''velvet revolution'' in Prague, or rejoiced in Berlin as the wall came down” (Kaufman, 
2004, para. 2). 
 
However, among those positive characteristics there was also one critical suggestion 
about the pro-Yuschenko protesters: “it would be wrong to romanticize the widespread 
protests in the streets of Kiev, which carry a dollop of an unsavory form of nationalism” 
(“Saying No,” 2004, para. 4). 
 Unlike the opposition protesters, the Yanukovych supporters were mentioned in the 
New York Times’ coverage seldom, and their portrayal was predominantly negative: “the 
bands of Yanukovich supporters… are often menacing and rude; today they catcalled to 
pedestrians and passing traffic with some of the most foul Russian insults” (Chivers, 2004, 
para. 30). Even though the New York Times journalists reported that “in eastern Ukraine, 
March 17-19, 2006 
 28 
hundreds of thousands of Mr. Yanukovich's supporters took to the streets” (Meyers, 2004, 
para. 9), no details of the pro-Yanukovych demonstrations were provided. Much later, after 
the end of the campaign, the newspaper mentioned that they “lack the size and fervor of 
those [demonstrations] that clogged Kiev and other cities in what became known as the 
‘orange revolution’” (Meyers, 2005, para. 11).  
 For American reporters it was the gap between “those comfortable living in a 
centralized and disciplined form of post-Soviet government” and “a free-wheeling, flower-
waving generation” (Chivers, 2004, para. 15) that characterized the difference between 
Yanukovych and Yuschenko supporters. Thus, the supporters of Yuschenko were shown as 
democratic and, thus, “more ‘European’” (Meyers, 2004, para. 17), while the Yanukovych’s 
supporters were portrayed as the remnants of the Soviet past.  
 The fact that most Yuschenko’s supporters were from Western and Central Ukraine, 
while most Yanukovych’s followers were from Ukrainian East led to the exaggeration of the 
difference between these regions, as well as of the risk of “civil war” (Chivers, 2004, para. 1), 
and to headlines like “A Tug of War over Ukraine” (Meyers, 2004). Thus, the New York 
Times provided its readers with the image of the sharply divided country consisting of two 
hostile parts, even though the real picture of Ukraine was much more complicated. It has 
several very different regions which were not mentioned in the coverage (for instance, the 
bilingual Central Ukraine that balances the extreme East and West). 
 
Izves t ia 
Izvestia did not make any moral claims about the nature of the conflict and its 
participants in the beginning of the campaign. Moreover, it mentioned that “falsifications 
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were always present in democratic Ukraine” (Pankin, 2004, para. 7), thus implying that the 
electoral fraud is a usual Ukrainian (and, actually, post-Soviet) political practice. Izvestia 
ridiculed the Western observers, for example their critical suggestions made even before the 
first round of election.  The headline “Observers Decided To Criticize Ukrainian Elections 
In Good Time” (Shesternina, 2004) implied that they were overcritical. 
Russian newspaper also stressed that both government and opposition were 
responsible for the election fraud. Moreover, in its coverage of voting it reported mostly 
about the falsification in Western Ukraine, the Yuschenko’s stronghold: 
“The main [falsification] is the attempt of people in Western Ukraine, which is 
sympathetic to Yuschenko, to vote using the passports of people, who are working 
abroad” (Grigorieva & Sokolovskaya, 2004, para. 14). 
 
Taking into account that in reality the Yanukovych’s camp was largely responsible 
for most irregularities, and they took place in Eastern Ukraine, this portrayal was actually an 
attempt to move the negative characteristic of fraud-maker from Yanukovych to Yuschenko, 
or at least make both sides look guilty. 
 In reporting the foreign influence on Ukrainian campaign, Izvestia was always honest 
about what candidate their country supported: “It is not a secret – Kremlin does everything 
possible to secure the Yanukovych’s victory” (Grigorieva, 2004, para. 2); “Putin clearly stated 
that Kremlin desires Yanukovych’s victory” (Zaytsev, 2004, para. 1). But only toward the 
end of the ‘Orange Revolution’ Izvestia recognized that Russian interference into Ukrainian 
elections was immoral: “The main Russian mistake was not that it supported the wrong guy, 
but that it supported anybody and, moreover, actively” (Pankin, 2004, para. 6). However, 
this critical analysis of the Russian involvement into the Ukrainian presidential campaign was 
just a postscript to two months of unbalanced coverage. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 The findings of this study suggest that both the New York Times and Izvestia employed 
a conflict frame in their coverage of the 2004 presidential elections and the ‘Orange 
Revolution’ in Ukraine. This frame emphasizes conflict between individuals, groups, or 
institutions, and is conceptually related to strategy coverage. This type of coverage makes 
winning and losing the central concept; thus the vocabulary of wars, games, and competition 
was often used, and the performance of a party or an individual was highlighted (Valkenburg, 
1999). 
 As we see, both Izvestia and the New York Times identified more than one problem in 
their coverage of the Ukrainian presidential election, and at least two of them were the same 
– the electoral fraud, and the split between Eastern and Western Ukraine. However, 
American daily focused on the fraud as the primary problem, while Russian newspaper – on 
the historical Ukrainian East-West divide. This choice perfectly fitted the overall strategy 
employed by them: Izvestia tried to downplay the ‘Orange Revolution’ as an example of the 
direct democracy; instead it was portrayed as a prosaic regional conflict with an old history 
of its own. On the other hand, the New York Times emphasized the democratic nature of the 
protest movement; for American newspaper, ‘Orange Revolution’ was a successor of the 
Eastern European ‘velvet revolutions’ of late 1980s. 
 Therefore, the causes in the New York Times’ coverage were the corrupt Ukrainian 
government of president Kuchma and Prime Minister Yanukovych and its Russian allies, 
particularly president Vladimir Putin. They were the negative characters in the election’s 
coverage, while Ukrainian opposition led by Yuschenko and Western ‘mediators’ were the 
positive ones. Western interference was never seriously discussed by American newspaper. 
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Creating the enemy image for one side of the conflict and the favorable image for another 
resulted in the recreation of the Cold War frame. 
 In Izvestia’s coverage, opposition leader Yuschenko and his supporters in Ukraine 
and in the West were the causes of the conflict. They were given the negative characteristics, 
while Yanukovych was praised as a ‘pro-Russian leader.’ Therefore, the Russian newspaper’s 
frame was the same as the American’s one: the conflict frame resembling the Cold War 
picture of the world. However, toward the end of the campaign there was a significant 
change in Izvestia’s coverage – Russian newspaper recognized that Russia was also one of the 
conflict’s causes; and it meant that Izvestia’s frame was not so rigid as the New York Times’ 
one. 
 The New York Times’ solution for the conflict was the Western mediation effort, and 
as the West’s position was in line with the Ukrainian opposition’s demands, the American 
newspaper actually took its side in the conflict. On the contrary, Izvestia didn’t offer any clear 
solution. However, it objected to any foreign pressure (therefore, condemning Western 
mediation as an interference), and expected the solution will come from within Ukraine.  
 In their moral claims, American reporters relied on the principles of democracy. 
Therefore, Yuschenko and his supporters (and the West) were portrayed as fighting for the 
right cause, while Yanukovych and his followers (and Russia) were backing the post-Soviet 
authoritarian regime. Russian journalists did not make any moral claims in the beginning of 
the campaign asserting that democratic principles were unimportant, and even tried to put 
the responsibility for falsification on the opposition. However, Izvestia had to recognize the 
negative role of Russia in the Ukrainian crisis toward the end of the crisis. 
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 In general, the New York Times and Izvestia framed Ukrainian political crisis in a 
similar way. Both newspapers saw Ukraine as a geopolitical prize in a confrontation between 
Russia and the Western countries. Therefore, they favorably portrayed their ‘allies,’ and 
negatively – their ‘enemies’ both in Ukraine and in the outer world. To complete the frame, 
the keyword ‘Cold War’ was often used to characterize the tensions between the Kremlin 
and the West by both Izvestia and the New York Times.  
 The Izvestia’s frame appeared to be less rigid than the New York Times’ one, as 
Russian newspaper recognized its country’s interference into Ukrainian affairs as negative. 
On the contrary, American newspaper was confident till the end of the campaign that the 
West was doing the right thing in Ukraine. However, what both newspapers failed or chose 
not to report was the fact that in reality the 2004 presidential election was the internal 
Ukrainian conflict, and both sides first of all were pursuing their own goals (namely power) 
which had nothing to do with the geopolitics. 
 Overall, both the New York Times’ and Izvestia’s coverage may be characterized as a 
dichotomization based on serviceability to domestic power interests, which is one of the 
propaganda model’s filters1 (Herman & Chomsky, 2002). Herman and Chomsky’s findings 
show that the elections in client states are usually found by American media legitimizing, 
irrespective of facts, while the elections in enemy states are found deficient.  
This study offers only brief analysis of the New York Times and Izvestia coverage of 
the political crisis in Ukraine in 2004. Further research in this area may also include a study 
                                                
1 The Propaganda model is “an analytical framework that attempts to explain the performance of the U.S. 
media in terms of the basic institutional structures and relationships within which they operate” (Herman & 
Chomsky, 2002, p. xi). It “traces the routes by which money and power are able to filter out the news fit to 
print, marginalize dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their messages 
across to the public” (Herman & Chomsky, 2002, p. 2). 
March 17-19, 2006 
 34 
of the electronic media coverage of the ‘Orange Revolution’ in Russia and the West, as well 
as a study of the Western and Russian news media coverage of other modern-day velvet 
revolutions (Serbia 2001, Georgia 2003, Kyrgyzstan 2005).  
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APPENDIX A 
Codesheet 
 
1. Name of the publication 
 
2. Date and year 
 
3. Length and location; type (news story, commentary, editorial)  
 
4. Title and author 
 
5. What keywords, metaphors, phrases, or sentences are used to describe the campaigning 
and voting process? What sources are used to interpret the situation? 
6. What keywords, metaphors, phrases, or sentences are used to describe the mass 
demonstrations? 
7. What keywords, metaphors, phrases, or sentences are used to describe the main 
candidates (Yushchenko and Yanukovich), their political platforms and popular supporter? 
8. What keywords, metaphors, phrases, or sentences are used to describe the Ukrainian 
history and present situation? How is the difference between Ukrainian East and West 
characterized? 
9. What keywords, metaphors, phrases, or sentences are used to describe the foreign 
actions/attitudes (world leaders, the USA, Russia, the European Union, the West)? 
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APPENDIX B  
 
List of the New York Times  Articles 
Arvedlund, E. E. (2004, December 2). Russian Talk on Ukraine Recalls Cold War. New York 
Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database database. 
Chivers, C. J. (2004, November 22). Ukraine Awaits Presidential Runoff Result. New York 
Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database database.  
Chivers, C. J. (2004, November 23). Premier Claims He's The Winner In Ukraine Vote. New 
York Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database database. 
Chivers, C. J. (2004, November 24). Protests Grow as Ukraine Vote Crisis Deepens. New 
York Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database database. 
Chivers, C. J. (2004, November 25). Ukraine Premier Is Named Winner; U.S. Assails Move. 
New York Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database. 
Chivers, C. J. (2004, November 26). Ukraine Court Delays Results In Vote Dispute. New 
York Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database.  
Chivers, C. J. (2004, November 27). Rivals in Ukraine Agree to Negotiate Over Disputed 
Vote. New York Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database. 
Chivers, C. J. (2004, November 28). Youth Movement Underlies The Opposition in Ukraine. 
New York Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database. 
Chivers, C. J. (2004, November 30). In a World Below, Bedrock Resistance to Protests in 
Kiev. New York Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database. 
Chivers, C. J. (2004, December 4). It Was Dec. 3, but in Kiev, New Year Began Yesterday. 
New York Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database. 
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Chivers, C. J. (2004, December 5). Ukrainian Turns Illness Into Symbol for Nation's Woes. 
New York Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database. 
Chivers, C. J. (2004, December 7). Putin Says He Will Accept the Will of the Ukrainian 
People. New York Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database. 
Chivers, C. J. (2004, December 27). Pro-West Leader Appears To Win Ukraine Election. 
New York Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database. 
Chivers, C. J. (2004, December 28). Yushchenko Wins 52% of Vote; Rival Vows a Challenge. 
New York Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database. 
Chivers, C. J. (2005, January 6). Ukraine: Yanukovich's Resignation Accepted. New York 
Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database. 
Judt, T. (2004, December 5). The Eastern Front, 2004. New York Times. Retrieved May 5, 
2005, from Lexis-Nexis database. 
Kristof, N. D. (2004, December 4). Let My People Go. New York Times. Retrieved May 5, 
2005, from Lexis-Nexis database. 
Meyers, S. L. (2004, October 12). Eggs and Charges Fly in Ukraine's Ever-Nastier Election. 
New York Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database. 
Meyers, S. L. (2004, November 1). Rivals in Ukraine Report Violations in Presidential Vote. 
New York Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database. 
Meyers, S. L. (2004, November 2). Ukraine Vote For President In Virtual Tie; Runoff Is Due. 
New York Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database. 
Meyers, S. L. (2004, November 14). Putin Uses Soft Power to Restore the Russian Empire. 
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May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database. 
Meyers, S. L. (2004, November, 28). Parliament Says Votes In Ukraine Were Not Valid. New 
York Times. Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database. 
Meyers, S. L. (2004, December 3). Putin Backs Ukrainian Leader, Dismissing Call for New 
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